than one interpretation of a word or phrase, or to obtain the pragmatic point implicit in the meaning of several words. To test this hypothesis, Beeman et al. conducted a hemifield priming experiment. Subjects either read target words proceeded by three weakly related primes, or they read target words proceeded by one strong prime (flanked by two unrelated words). When naming targets presented to the right hemisphere, subjects benefited equally from both prime types, but benefited more from the one strong prime when naming targets presented to the left hemisphere.
Why the two hemispheres differ in their degree of sensitivity to semantic overlap of multiple words remains to be addressed. Finding evidence that it reflects the conflicting demands of precision and creativity would do much to legitimize the notion that the structure of language is an exquisite interplay of speakers' diverse communicative needs.
Philosophers of science have long noted that the right theoretical metaphor can do much to invigorate even an ancient field. It is too early to know if the coarse coding metaphor will propel the field of lexical semantics, but an increased understanding of the nature of semantic continuums will do much to change polysemy from problem to delight for students of language. present in other cognitive domains.
I've proposed that the basic representational structure underlying linguistic knowledge is an associative pairing between actual sentences and their meanings. To the extent that humans possess templates, schemas, categories and rules, these are abstractions over stored utterance-meaning pairs. Among readers sympathetic to this proposal, I anticipate there will be those who find it so commonsensical as to render exposition unnecessary, while others may find much of it a restatement of ideas already thriving in the literature. I happily grant the latter point and will identify below at least a few of the theorists with whom these ideas originated. But it is worth emphasizing that the memory-based approach is strongly at odds with conventional wisdom about the nature of language.
A succinct statement of this conventional wisdom is Aitchison's (1991) explanation (to a general audience) that generalizations, not utterance-meaning pairs, are the fundamental representational structure of linguistic knowledge. "A language such as English does not have, say, 7,123,541 possible sentences which people gradually learn, one by one. Instead, the speakers of a language have a finite number of principles or 'rules' which enable them to understand and put together a potentially infinite number of sentences" (p. 14). After presenting examples of phonological and morphological rules, Aitchison concludes, "In brief, humans do not learn lists of utterances. Instead, they learn a number of principles or rules which they follow subconsciously."
I have proposed that utterances are precisely what humans learn. Generalizations are hardwon, and are extracted only to the extent that they are licensed by statistical regularities, and existing abstractions over statistical regularities. The importance of people's store of expressions has been expressed by Langacker (1987) as follows:
The grammar lists the full set of particular statements representing a speaker's grasp of linguistic convention, including those subsumed by general statements. Rather than thinking them an embarrassment, cognitive linguistics regard particular statements as the matrix from which general statements (rules) are extracted (p. 46).
The present proposal can be viewed as a logical extension of the approach to morphology championed by Joan Bybee (1985) . Bybee notes that the traditional concern of the field of morphology, dividing words into parts and assigning meaning to the parts, fails because it is impossible to find boundaries between morphemes, and because morphemes change shape in different environments. If the field of morphology can not aspire to finding a one-to-one relation between semantic units and their phonological expression, what should be morphologists' goal? Bybee takes on the task of explaining deviations from one-to-one correspondence in terms of general cognitive characteristics of human language users. One of these is human's ability to use rote processing even for forms that could be morphologically decomposed, and the tendency for frequency of occurrence to be the key characteristic that supports rote processing.
I am not the first to import the coarse coding metaphor from visual processing to the domain of word meaning. Drawing on findings that patients with right hemisphere lesions have problems understanding nonliteral and pragmatic implications of linguistic expressions, cognitive neuroscientists Beeman, Friedman, Grafman, Perez, Diamond & Lindsay (1992) hypothesized that the right hemisphere, more than the left hemisphere, may coarsely code semantic information. By "greater coarse coding" in the right hemisphere the authors mean that large semantic fields are weakly activated, allowing concepts that are more distantly related to the input word to become activated. This "long distance" activation could be what mediates the RH's ability to obtain more letter string is a word; Forster, 1981; Gernsbacher, 1984) .
One significant processing cost is the difficulty of finding the phonological representation of a word or words given the intent to communicate a specific concept or set of concepts. This link between meaning and sound in producing a sentence has been hypothesized to be the weak link in the chain of linguistic processing (Bates & Wulfeck, 1989) . If this is indeed a weak link, then words that are easily accessible will be maintained in the lexicon. The characteristics of words that facilitate access are likely to include high frequency, high valence match with adjoining words, and high routinization of word combinations.
Two types of evidence suggest that the link between meaning and sound is likely to be the weakest link in sentence processing. Cognitive psychologists have shown that the more arbitrary an association, the more difficult to learn and more vulnerable to forgetting it is, and the more its access is facilitated by frequency of exposure (Anderson, 1983) . Aphasiologists have suggested that anomia (word finding difficulties) may be the common ingredient in the diversity of types of aphasia (Bates & Wulfeck, 1989) .
One method for protecting the weak link between meaning and access to the sound pattern is to increase the frequency of access. Words that are repeatedly used will be more likely to remain in the language. Polysemy is thus a feature that decreases speakers' processing costs by decreasing the effort necessary for access.
Above we noted that generality of meaning, or high number of distinct meanings ("wide receptive field"), leads to high usage frequency. But causality may flow in the other direction. Words that are highly frequent are those that will be easiest to access, and thus are likely to be extended into new semantic territory, either to fill a new semantic niche that has appeared due to technological or cultural innovation, or to supplant existing words that may be harder to access because of their lower frequency.
Pressures opposing polysemy. Not all words are highly polysemous. One force at work is likely to be speakers' goal of maximizing communicative impact. All animal species grow accustomed to the commonplace and dishabituate to novelty (Lehmann, 1985) . Historical linguists refer to the "semantic bleaching" that accompanies the extension of a word into new semantic territories (Sweetser, 1988) . To increase impact, speakers are motivated to recruit old words to new uses, or to coin new lexical items. A second force for new coinages and for words with a restricted semantic range is that coarse-coding schemes have disadvantages when fine semantic distinctions are required. Many "overlapping receptive fields" need to be present to pinpoint a very precise meaning. If each of these receptive fields is a word, then the string of words necessary to convey a specific meaning would place processing burdens on speaker and hearer. Speakers will be motivated to use less phonological material, a motivation which may lead to the coining of new words.
Closing Remarks, Related Approaches
The short form of my proposal is that both language form and meaning are stored in chunks larger than a word, and that therefore the meaning of words is usually tightly linked to their typical contexts of occurrence. If we think it probable that a similar "microstructure of cognition" underlies linguistic as well as nonlinguistic abilities, then the continuum of context-dependency one observes in looking at word meaning is just a linguistic manifestation of a continuum that is omni-the training set to incorporate distinct senses for came and got, the fact that they could occur with the four highly polysemous prepositions meant that they ended up associated with a large number of meaning vectors. It would be helpful to more rigorously control the implementation of "number of distinct senses" and "diversity of contexts", and to think about whether it is important for our theories of the human lexicon to be sensitive to this difference.
Assessment of the implementation of prepositional polysemy
A drawback of the implementation just described is that words are identified with specific input nodes. A superior design would pair a phonological representation with semantic-feature vectors. This would allow word-sized phonological chunks to come to activate a distinct hiddenunit activation pattern to the extent that these word-sized chunks were predictive of meaning independent of their context.
The positive points of the current implementation are that it illustrates several aspects of the theoretical proposal described in the first section of this chapter.
• Implements the idealization of language as a set of associations between form and meaning, where "forms" are grammatical word combinations rather than words. Words in this model were not directly associated with specific meanings (except for the trajectors and landmarks, which were always paired with a few features in the output vector regardless of the other items in the input vector). Instead, the network was trained to associate an entire "sentence" of the form subject verb preposition object with a semantic feature vector which encoded the relationship holding between the subject and object.
• Continuum of context-dependency which reflects co-occurrence statistics, as reflected in the degree to which the hidden units activated by a particular word are the same as those activated by the words with which it typically co-occurs.
• Presents a metaphor for conceptualizing the differences among, and the connection between, linguistic and non-linguistic aspects of meaning. The input nodes play the role of information about the form (sound or inscription) of words. The output nodes can be analogized to nonlinguistic meaning, including synapses to neurons that activate longterm memories and motor outputs. The weight matrices interposed between these two can be conceptualized as the linguistic aspects of meaning: the categories, rules and mappings that mediate between purely completely arbitrary representations (the forms of words) and the conceptual structures they ultimately evoke.
Processing Factors
According to the coarse-coding proposal presented in this chapter, the problem of sense selection is minimized in natural language comprehension because processing units which encode a words' diverse senses also encode words' typical linguistic contexts. Once we have removed the problem of why polysemy does not tax comprehension, we are left with reasons for why polysemy is commonsensical. Intuitively, words that cover a large semantic territory will be used often because they fit more communicative contexts: high frequency derives from applicability. An additional factor is the correlation between frequency and ease of lexical access. Usage frequency of a word, as measured by word counts in written texts (or by speakers' rating of familiarity), is the most consistent predictor of reaction time to naming and lexical decision tasks (i.e., deciding if a hidden-layer organization was that hidden units were always jointly activated by words in different sentence positions. For example, the hidden units that became strongly activated by the input node for walk were also activated both by items such as ran and moved as well as input items which commonly occurred with these motion verbs, such as agentive subjects, the path prepositions over, across, and prepositional objects such as hill and yard. The network appeared to take two solutions to the problem of polysemy. It created internal categories corresponding to sentence-size templates, and it evolved hidden units which conflated semantic attributes of various senses of the polysemous words with their typical contexts of occurrence.
To examine the extent to which the hidden-units illustrate the "continuum of context dependency" I analyzed all weights extending from the inputs to the hidden-layer in the following manner. An input unit was classified as activating a given hidden unit if the weight from the input to the hidden unit was greater than the hidden unit's bias weight. In this network, a word's degree of context-dependency is encoded by the extent to which the word activates hidden-units which are also activated by its frequent left and right neighbors. To quantify this, the number of hiddenunits which were activated both by a preposition and each of the preposition's possible direct objects was calculated. (Keep in mind that the activation of hidden-units is akin to the network's encoding of the meaning of each word --the regularities in its co-occurrences with the semantic feature vector.) The graphs in Figure 5 plot the number of hidden-units activated for by prepositions and 17 selected direct objects. We can see that items which frequently occur together (such as frequent direct objects of over and across, the items building, hill and bridge) jointly activate more hidden units than items which don't occur together, such as the non-occurring combinations over the book and across the contract. Note that above strongly doesn't share strong encoding with any of the direct objects. This is consonant with above's relative context-independence.
Varied size of receptive field. The number of hidden units activated by an input unit can be called that input's "coarse-coding count" and viewed as the size of that item's "receptive field." The coarse-coding counts for the 81 input nodes varied from 0 to 12. The four "high polysemy" prepositions had coarse-coding accounts of 5 to 6, while the "low polysemy" prepositions (above and under) only activated 2 hidden units each.
The three inputs which activated no hidden units were cost, spent and had_authority. Why would a word activate no hidden units? A word need not activate any hidden units if the output vector that occurs in all the word's contexts is totally predictable by the other items in the input vector. In natural language this is seldom, if ever, the case, but in the relatively artificial data set constructed for this simulation, the verbs cost, spent and had_authority added no information to the other words in the vector. All input vectors containing cost and spent also had either $100 or $1000 as the preposition's direct object. The verb had_authority always occurred in the context of person had_authority over person, a pattern which always activated the feature specifying the power domain.
The correlation between the number of distinct senses of a word in the training corpus and that item's coarse-coding count was only 0.29. The sheer diversity of environments, independent of the question of number of senses, appeared to be the crucial factor for an item to activate a large number of hidden units. For example, the verbs came and got were in the medium polysemy group, yet after training ended up with a high coarse-coding count. Although I did not construct Place Figure 5 Approximately Here only had three senses, corresponding to whether they co-occurred with the prepositions over, under or around. At the other extreme, verbs such as ran and lay occurred with diverse polysemes of all the prepositions.
The corpus was trained using back-propagation (Rumelhart, Hinton & Williams, 1986 ) until error asymptoted (at 25,000 cycles --roughly 10 training cycles per input-output item).
Network behavior
Category abstraction. In previous work (Hinton, 1986; Harris, 1990 and others) it has been observed that the hidden-units of networks trained by back-propagation self-organize to categorize aspects of the input vector which participate in similar relations with other parts of the input, or which are paired with similar outputs. For example, some of the hidden units may evolve to have identical activations for the items tunnel, woods and field, to capture the regularities in sentences differing only by this word, such as hiker walked through tunnel, hiker walked through woods, and hiker walked through field.
Because of the large number of patterns in the corpus described above, the network can best decrease error by evolving hidden units that are selectively activated by items that participate in distributional regularities. For convenience, I'll refer to these hidden-unit organizations as categories. The categories formed by the network during training will vary in their specificity according to the demands of the regularities in the input-output patterns. For example, one of the main distinctions in verbs was whether they participated in spatial or mental relations. The mental verbs read, thought, argued and talked participated in very similar vectors and were thus categorized by the network without further subdivisions. In contrast, the spatial verbs (stood, is, lived, arrived, came, got, flew, moved, walked, ran, lay, and stretched) were similar and dissimilar to each other depending on the other words in the sentence. The verb ran behaved similarly to flew, moved, and walked (in denoting motion) when these words occurred with agentive subjects (soldier, conspirators, children, hiker, birds) . But ran behaved similarly to another set of verbs (stretched, lay and was) when it occurred with non-agentive subjects such as road, river and fence.
Context dependency. As just described, the network's hidden units did function as abstractions over items that fall in specific sentence positions. However, a more striking feature of the predicting what invariances will be extracted, and how the degree of specificity of an extracted invariance is related to the pool of utterances it summarizes. The extracted invariances will be those that were instrumental in learning the training corpus, and will thus be dependent on the type and token frequencies of pattern-set exemplars, and representational resources of the network (i.e., number of weights). These invariances will naturally include the semantic and thematic associations between words that psycholinguistics have long observed in priming and reading-time experiments.
In the next section, I illustrate some aspects of this proposal by describing a simple connectionist network of prepositional polysemy.
An Illustrative Model
In Harris (1992, in press) distributed representations were used to model the mapping from a sentence containing polysemous prepositions to a representation of the sentence's meaning. Prepositional polysemy was selected as the example problem because the mapping from spatial expressions to their interpretation contains regularities which vary in their scope of application (Brugman 1988; Hawkins 1984) . These regularities could be described by rules, although they would have to be rules that either have exceptions or are rules which have very specific conditions of application. Alternately, the regularities in mapping could be described by a constraint-satisfaction system. I took the approach that the constraints emerge from the matrix of stored utterancemeaning pairs (Langacker, 1987) .
Construction of corpus and training
2617 sentences of the form subject verb {over, across, through, around, above, under} object were constructed using 81 vocabulary items. The training corpus consisted of these sentences paired with hand-coded feature vectors identifying salient semantic properties of the sentence's gestalt meaning. These features included domain features (that is, in which cognitive domain does the profiled relation exist: the domain of space, of time, of money, of interpersonal power, of mental concepts), dimensionality and other salient properties of the primary figures (that is, the subject sentence and object of the preposition, also called the figure and ground, or trajector and landmark), and type of path (curved, end-point-focus). Figure 4 depicts the network architecture, while Table 2 lists some of the sentence templates (word combinations associated with semantic features) that were used to generate the corpus.
A goal in constructing the corpus of utterance-meaning pairs was to include words which fall on a continuum of polysemy and which vary in the predictability of their left and right neighbors. I choose 4 prepositions which are relatively highly polysemous (over, across, through, around) and 2 that intuitively have only fewer different senses (above, under) . The corpus was also constructed to contain verbs that had either little polysemy (1 to 4 senses), medium polysemy (6 to 10 senses), or high polysemy (13-20 senses). In this corpus, for example, the verbs cost and spent
Why don't words with many meanings, or one abstract meaning, pose a comprehension burden?
If multiple senses of a polysemous word are represented in the lexicon, then the language listener is burdened with the task of selecting the current sense from all of those listed in the lexicon. On the other hand, if the lexicon contains only a maximally abstract encoding, along with abstract representation of allowable arguments, our challenge is to articulate the rules of contextual inference allowing the concept "steal" to be inferred from sentences such as The thief took the jewels (Jackendoff, 1982; Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976 ). On both accounts, words which can potentially cover a large semantic territory should impose a comprehension burden, yet studies have failed to find that sentences containing these words are more difficult to understand than sentences containing words with more specific senses (Millis & Button, 1989) .
One explanation for this might be that the extra processing burden of matching the multiple senses of a polysemous word to that word's context is obscured by the processing advantage of being high in frequency as the majority of polysemous words are (Gernsbacher, 1984) . I agree that the high frequency of polysemous words is part of the reason for their continued use, but would like to add that in many cases (although not all), polysemy does not pose a comprehension burden because the unit that initiates lexical access includes disambiguating lexical neighbors. Cut doesn't activate all its possible senses, because the system begins lexical access with cut in, cut up, cut down or the like. (In addition, we don't have to propose additional machinery to explain how the appropriate sense of cut up is obtained from the listing of meanings for cut and up. 3 But my claim is more than the idea that verb + particle has the status of lexical entry. My view (following Langacker, 1987) is that there is no predefined limit on what amount of phonological signal can be used to activate a stable interpretation. Instead, there are mappings from larger combinations (phrases, even sentences) to stable interpretations, with varying degrees of componentiality within the larger combinations. Frequency of occurrence, and reliability of the form-meaning mappings, are candidates for the factors that determine what parts of the speech stream come to be represented in a relatively context-free manner.
Computational realization
In what type of representational system could these ideas could be computationally realized? We desire a system with the following properties.
1. Stable (i.e. conventionalized) form-meaning mappings can exist over linguistic units that vary in size, from sub-word units (morphemes and phoneme clusters with meaning connotations, such as English umble) to multi-word combinations (including valence-match pairs, and idioms and other collocations).
2. The associations between forms and their meanings are sensitive to horizontal co-occurrence statistics as well as the variety of meanings that a word can evoke (MacDonald, 1992; Juliano, Trueswell &Tanenhaus, 1992) . Horizontal co-occurrence statistics are the frequent left and right neighbors of a word (as well as categorial abstractions over these neighbors).
3. Many theorists recognize that the semantics of verb + particle combinations is such that these combination may require lexical entry status. But as long observed by Fillmore (1988) and more recently pointed out by Jackendoff (1992), granting lexical entry status to verb + particle combinations will take care of these obvious cases, but does nothing for the myriad other non-compositional conventional collocations.
the basis of constancy of meaning, factors such as frequency may make it the "right-sized" unit for mental manipulation and mental representation. Intuitively, the larger the unit, the less frequently the entire unit will appear in spoken and written texts. While whole sentences do repeat themselves in the ambient language (especially colloquialisms or other fixed expressions such as Easy does it!), they repeat themselves far less frequently then word combinations or single words.
A comparison of the frequency of cut to the frequency of cut in combinations is illustrated in Figure 3 . Cut appears 208 times in the Brown corpus.The most frequent cut combinations of size 2 include cut the (17 occurrences) cut off (16 occurrences), cut down (12 occurrences), cut in (9), cut his (9), cut across (8), cut to (7), cut through (6), cut it (6), cut up (5), cut into (4), cut from (4) and cut over (2). Mean frequencies were calculated for all occurrences of cut combinations of sizes 2, 3, and 4. The "Log Frequency" curve represents the frequency, on a logarithm scale, of the single word cut (log of 208 = 5.33) and the mean frequencies of cut combinations of size 2, 3, and 4. Superimposing the Log Frequency curve over the curve from Figure 2 illustrates the idea that a unit that is about the size of either the word or a valanced-match combination may gain special representation or access status due to an optimal interaction between frequency and constancy of meaning.
Words' contextual stickiness
Language acquisition researches have noted that children usually first acquire words in one context of use, such as only saying bye bye! when guests drive away in a car, or when the word deep is first restricted to describing puddles, and only more later understood to be applicable to swimming pools (Clark, 1983) . Children also often learn a whole phrase as one unit, only later having the ability to use the parts out of their original linguistic context, as in the demand many children can make at 15 months of age, Iwandat! (Bates, Bretherton, & Synder, 1989) . With time and linguistic practice, words do of course unstick from their original linguistic and extralinguistic environments, but it is likely that many words never entirely "unstick". This is most clearly seen with low frequency words such as paragon, a word whose meaning may be retrievable to some speakers only its typical linguistic context, paragon of virtue.
A second sign of words' contextual stickiness comes from psycholinguistic evidence that words are more easily accessed and more quickly understood in conventional contexts (see Van Petten & Kutas, 1990 for a review as well as relevant electrophysiological data). Models of the mental lexicon typically incorporate information about words' typical contexts of co-occurrence by positing spreading-activation links between semantically and thematically related words. It is assumed that these links are built up out of speakers' years of experience with words in diverse contexts. But how these links are obtained from experiential corpora has never been described. In the next section I suggest how the memory-based (or coarse-coding) view of the lexicon may be able to explain this. On this view, there is a continuum of context-independence, with some words tightly associated with their typical neighbors, and others relatively independent. But what accounts for the enduring appeal of the notion that words are a privileged unit of mental representation? I suggest that words are privileged, not because of special ontological status, but because the word is the size of unit which maximizes a trade-off between frequency of usage and constancy of interpretation.
To explain what I mean by a trade-off between usage frequency and constancy of meaning, I will recruit some data from my ongoing study of the polysemes of the word cut. I first investigated how many left-and-right context words were required for native speakers to identify the intended sense of cut . All instances of cut (nouns, verbs and adjectives) from the Brown University corpus (Francis & Kucera, 1989 ) and the Lancaster University corpus were extracted in a manner that preserved five words of left context and five words of right context, to yield 11-word discourse fragments, with cut being the central word. Two 22-year old native English speakers were given 15 minutes of training on how to categorize cut utterances into a classification system of cut senses similar to that described in Harris & Touretzky (1991) . Some examples of the classifications made by raters are listed in Table 1 .
The two raters each judged the sense of 231 utterances in four separate sessions that took 40 minutes each to complete. Raters sat in front of a Macintosh which controlled stimulus display and stored reaction times. Raters saw first a three-word utterance in which cut was the central word. After making a judgement of what sense of cut it was, they indicated their degree of confidence in this judgement by hitting a key for either "guess", "some confidence" or "know for sure." At this point the computer presented an additional right and left neighbor, and raters again selected a sense and gave their confidence rating. For each utterance there were a total of 5 increments of context to make up the 11-word discourse fragment, and thus 5 sense judgements for each utterance. Figure 2 shows the percent of utterances that were rated as either "know for sure" or "some confidence" with each increment of context. The absolute number of each type of judgement at the various increments obviously depends on task demands, such as the pressure raters may have felt to say "guess" at the 3-word and 5-word fragments to avoid the embarrassment of later reversals of judgement. Nevertheless, what is important is that there is no fixed amount of context necessary for determining the sense of cut. Instead, we have a continuum of contextual dependency.
Although the linguistic unit we call the "word" can not be accorded building-block status on Table 1 Discourse Fragment Sense Selected jar lids, omitting design disk. Cut a notch in lid for penetrate He waved at Fox to cut off the finale introduction. The eliminate were older two-story mansions, now cut up into furnished rooms and section Wars an Austrian threat to cut off supplies of coal to sever connection by the rotors. This was cut down to a minimum by reduce but you don't look exactly cut out for this life. Still shape/formed
Limits to Linguistic Compositionality
Three motivations for the coarse-coding view are the difficulty of specifying the building blocks of meaning construction, words' contextual stickiness, and our intuitions that highly polysemous words do not impose a burden on comprehension.
Is the word the building block?
By "word" I refer to our folk-concept of a coherent phonological entity. This folk-concept has been concretized in our orthographic systems and legitimized through dictionaries and cultural scripts on how to talk about meaning and intention (Reddy, 1979) . What remains unclear is whether words have distinct, individuated meanings that are discretely represented in some kind of mental structure such as the hypothetical mental lexicon.
It is now widely recognized that the meanings of 1 most natural language utterances are not obtained by concatenating the meanings of component words (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; Lakoff & Johnson, 1979; Brugman, 1988; Pinker, 1989; Pustejovsky, 1992) . Despite this widespread agreement, many theorists continue to regard words as the building blocks of meaningful communication. It is generally assumed by lexical theorists (e.g., Pinker, 1989 , Miller & Fellbaum, 1991 ) that words are privileged in at least two ways:
1. The form (either sound or orthography) of a word is associated with a data structure that is the primary storage site for linguistic meaning.
2. The form of a word is the entry-point into the representational system.
These two factors do not logically have to co-occur, and indeed we can imagine a representational and access system in which neither is true, or true only to a degree which may vary from word to word. Researchers who acknowledge the ubiquity of polysemy may find congenial the perspective illustrated in Figure 1A : the word is the entry-point into the system, but words activate representational structures that correspond to phonological units larger than a word.
The need for distinct meaning-representations that correspond to word combinations rather than words may be clearest to some readers for idioms such as Shut up and out of sight, yet is necessary for handling many types of valence-matched combinations, such as verb + particle (as in write off) or verb + high-valence matched noun phrase (such as open the door). 2 Once we accept that linguistic concepts are represented in meaning-chunks that correspond to language units larger than the word, it is only a short conceptual leap to the view expressed by Figure 1B , wherein the word is no longer the privileged entry-point, but 2-, 3, or 4-word combinations may 1. Some theorists consider the meaning of an utterance to be all evoked mental conceptualization (Langacker, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Deane, 1992) , while others identify linguistic meaning with a subset of this (Pinker, 1989) . Although my own bias is towards the former view, taking a stance on this point is not necessary for the current discussion of limitations on compositionality. 2. The term "valence-match" refers to word combinations having a close semantic fit between a predicate and arguments (Brugman, 1988; MacWhinney, 1989) . Examples include subcategorization and selectional restrictions, as matches between the semantics of prepositions and their direct objects, such as in the cupboard and over the hill.
Place Figure 1 Approximately Here this field.
Diameter and Overlap of Receptive Fields.
In visual cortex, individual neurons often have large receptive fields which have considerable overlap with other neurons. The location of a feature in the visual field is accurately pin-pointed when it falls within the receptive fields of a number of neurons. The joint activity of several neurons indicates that the feature is located at the intersection of the active units' receptive fields.
Accuracy Increases With Receptive Field Diameter.
If there is no overlap in receptive fields, then we have a localist encoding rather than a distributed one. We would say that the grain size of our coding scheme is fine, rather than coarse. No overlap means that single neurons are solely responsible for identifying the location of discriminable stimuli. If N processing units do not overlap, then N distinct locations in the visual field can be identified. But if we double the radius of a receptive field, then the fields of our N neurons will overlap, and we double the number of different locations that can be discriminated (assuming that each addition of an active neuron leads to a discernibly different network state.) 4. Coarse Coding Only Efficient if Features are Sparse. Hinton et al. point out that, if two or more stimuli in close proximity are to be distinguished, then coarse coding will hinder more than help: several processing units will become active in response to more than one stimulus. In this case, a finer-grained coding scheme is needed, perhaps even a localist encoding.
Coarse Coding and the Lexicon
In the visual-field example above, the receptive field of a neuron in visual cortez is the set of simpler neurons in the retinotopic map. For the word-meaning example I will develop here, I will refer to "processing units" instead of "neurons." The receptive field of these processing units is a field of simpler units. Concepts or meanings are patterns of activation across a pool of units. An individual simple unit does not have a distinct or determinable meaning.
My main proposal is that a word is akin to a processing unit with a receptive field that may vary in size and the degree to which it overlaps with the receptive fields of other words. On this metaphor, polysemous words have wide receptive fields, and thus cover large (and perhaps illdefined) areas of semantic space. A distinct meaning (i.e., small region of multi-dimensional semantic space) is identified when several words, or words plus aspects of the non-linguistic context, combine to narrow down the space of possible meanings.
On this interpretation, words do not encode one abstract meaning nor are they pointers to a list of several specific meanings. Instead, the mapping from sound to meaning is mediated by a coding scheme which varies in its coarseness. On different occasions of use, words communicate different pieces of information. Unambiguous pieces of information are usually communicated by the joint presence of several words. Coarse coding is an efficient representational scheme because, holding number of lexical items constant, a greater number of specific ideas can be communicated. For example, one could have a separate word for all the ways that an agent can act on an object using a sharp instrument, or one can have the single word cut. A specific intended meaning is pinpointed by conventional verb + particle combinations.
The traditional view of the advantage of stringing words together into larger units is that the individual items are the primitive building blocks of more complex ideas. The coarse-coding view suggests that multi-word compositions are used not only to construct a meaning that is more complex than any of its parts, but to pinpoint the concepts which are the intended building blocks. similar patterns reinforce each other, irregular patterns are maintained if favored by frequency, and novel patterns can be generated or interpreted on analogy to familiar ones (McClelland, Hinton & Rumelhart, 1986) . I will try to show how, in addition to providing a natural representation for idioms and conventional expressions, the coarse-coding view incorporates mechanisms for both context-sensitivity and the abstraction of argument structure and subcategorization relations.
I first describe coarse-coding schemes and why they are a useful way to conceive of lexical representation. Drawing on linguistic and psycholinguistic phenomena, I motivate the view that the primary unit of linguistic storage is not the word, but is some larger piece (phrase, clause and sentence). Some aspects of the coarse-coding proposal can be illustrated with an existing simple connectionist model of prepositional polysemy (Harris, 1991, in press ), although other aspects await a more thorough implementation. At that point in my story, a reader may well ask, if the organization of word and sentence meaning exquisitely reflects the statistics of the language, as I argue it does, what psychological variables constrain the statistics of the language? My view is that factors related to language processing and communicative function are the ultimate shapers. Following researchers in the grammaticalization framework (Meillet, 1958; Lehmann, 1985; Givon, 1989) , I characterize speakers' communicative needs as a trade-off between the need to minimize processing costs while maximizing communicative impact. Polysemy figures in this equation because polysemy boosts the usage frequency of a word, which drives down the cost of lexical access. But extending a word into varied semantic contexts semantically bleaches it (decreases its referential specificity), which decreases its communicative impact. To achieve maximal impact, speakers reach for fresh words (Lehmann, 1985) . The historically observed cycle of recruitment of a new item, increasing semantic extension, and subsequent phonological reduction and ultimate use as a grammatical morpheme (Sweetser, 1990) suggests that an encoding scheme which is inherently continuous will serve us well in understanding both synchronic and diachronic variation in words' form-meaning mappings.
Coarse Coding
In a coarse-coding scheme, the representational units do not match the information to be represented (e.g., "concepts") in a one-to-one fashion. Instead, each unit is active in representing a number of concepts. A concept is represented by a number of simultaneously active units. Distributed representations promote generalization (McClelland & Kawamoto, 1986; St. John & McClelland, 1988; Harris, 1990) and exhibit graceful degradation (if one unit is destroyed, no single pattern is destroyed, although several patterns might be slightly degraded; Hinton & Shallice, 1991 ). An additional computational advantage is representational efficiency (Hinton, Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986) . In a localist encoding, N units can represent at most N concepts. With coarse coding, a concept is represented by the joint activity in a number of units. The number of concepts that can be represented increases as the number of units that are simultaneously active increases (as long as each unit is active for several different concepts; Touretzky & Hinton, 1988) .
Coarse Coding and Locating Visual Features
One way to get a feel for how coarse coding leads to greater representational efficiency is to work through the visual processing example presented by Hinton, Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) . The following four ideas are important to their example.
1. Receptive Field. The receptive field of a neuron in visual cortex is the area of the visual field to which the neuron is sensitive. The neuron becomes active if there is movement or change within
